International Financial Issues in the Pacific Rim: Global Imbalances, Financial Liberalization, and Exchange Rate Policy (NBER-EASE Volume 17) by Chung-Shu Wu & Jin-Lung Lin
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: International Financial Issues in the Pacific Rim: Global Imbalances, 
Financial Liberalization, and Exchange Rate Policy (NBER-EASE Volume 17) 
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose, editors
Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN:  0-226-38682-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_08-1
Conference Dates: June 22-24, 2006
Publication Date: July 2008
Chapter Title:  The Relationship between Openness and Inflation in NIEs and the G7
Chapter Author:   Chung-Shu Wu, Jin-Lung Lin
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6981
Chapter pages in book: (109 - 137)4.1 Introduction
Investigating a sample of 114 countries, Romer (1993) found a signiﬁ-
cant negative relationship between openness and inﬂation. For a cross-
section data set that covers so many countries, it is diﬃcult for a researcher
to understand the economic situation of every country in the sample set. If
the set includes some countries that have a special economic structure, the
empirical results might be signiﬁcantly distorted. In this paper, we investi-
gate the relatively familiar economies, such as Newly Industrialized Econ-
omies (NIEs) and the G7, to verify the robustness of Romer’s ﬁndings. Our
empirical results show that openness and inﬂation do not have a regular re-
lationship as stated by Romer (1993).
Romer (1993) interpreted his ﬁndings by using the time consistency the-
ory of inﬂation, which states that in the more open economies the inﬂation
caused by a surprising monetary expansion will be higher. Therefore, the
monetary authorities in these countries tend to follow a more conservative
policy than those of less open economies. Since this argument has impor-
tant implications not only on the validity of time consistency policy, but
also on economic cooperation and integration, many researchers have fol-
lowed his footsteps and continue discussing the relationship between open-
ness and inﬂation. Among them, Lane (1997) built a small open economy
model which has a monopolistic distortion and nominal price rigidity in
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research assistance.the nontraded sector to illustrate that the gains at a surprising monetary
expansion are lower in a more open economy. In his empirical results, Lane
also found a signiﬁcant inverse relationship between openness and inﬂa-
tion. However, by dividing Romer’s sample into four groups of countries
according to the indebtedness level, Terra (1998) found a signiﬁcant nega-
tive relationship between openness and inﬂation only in the severely in-
debted countries. Moreover, using a variety of measures of the trade-oﬀbe-
tween output and inﬂation (the slope of the Phillips curve), Temple (2002)
could not ﬁnd a stable correlation between the trade-oﬀ and openness,
which cast doubts about the argument raised by Romer (1993).
Although the literature does not reﬂect a consensus about the relation-
ship between openness and inﬂation, most derived their results based on a
period averaged cross-section data. It is clear that a country’s openness or
inﬂation may vary dramatically during a certain period. To represent a
country’s characteristics by period averaged indexes may not reﬂect the ac-
tual phenomenon. Moreover, traditionally, researchers use the share of im-
ports in GDP or GNP as a proxy for openness. It is quite possible that some
countries have a very high imports share because of geographical or other
reasons, and have low inﬂation due to other factors (which may or may not
be explained by the time consistency theory). If we include these data into
a sample that does not have a regular relationship between openness and
inﬂation, it is very likely for us to ﬁnd a spurious “signiﬁcant relationship”
result. However, it is not because the theory is right, but because we have
not taken into account the problem of extreme value. To compare the em-
pirical results between Romer (1993) and Temple (2002), it can be noted
that the diﬀerence may result from excluding some countries with special
property.1 In this paper, we use a panel data set that includes some NIE
countries (Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, and Tai-
wan) and the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. and the
United States)2 to reinvestigate the relationship between openness and in-
ﬂation. Since the number of countries under investigation is only thirteen,
it is relatively easy for us to go through the patterns of openness and inﬂa-
tion of each country. Therefore, we can check the robustness of our empir-
ical results with regard to the extreme value problem. In addition, using the
panel data, we can verify the time consistency theory by examining the
corollary of the theory that the eﬀect of a monetary expansion on output
is smaller in a more open economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
historical patterns of openness and inﬂation of NIEs and the G7. Section
4.3 investigates the relationship between openness and inﬂation using an-
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1. Countries with high openness and low inﬂation, such as Singapore and Lesotho, are not
included in the sample set of Temple (2002). 
2. Since we run the time series regression in the latter part of this paper, we select the coun-
tries that have a complete quarterly data before 1990.nual panel data. The empirical results of a time series approach to the re-
lationship for each individual country are presented in section 4.4. In sec-
tion 4.5 we adopt a VAR analysis to examine the impacts of money supply
on output in order to check the corollary of Romer’s model (1993). Section
4.6 offers some conclusions.
4.2 Historical Patterns of Openness and Inﬂation of NIEs and the G7
The historical patterns of imports (imports/GDP), shares, and the an-
nual growth rate of the GDP deﬂator of thirteen countries are plotted in
ﬁgure 4.1 and ﬁgure 4.2. From ﬁgure 4.1 it can be noticed that some coun-
tries such as Canada, Hong Kong, Italy, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan,
and the United States have a signiﬁcant upward trend for imports shares.
However, some countries like Japan, Singapore, and United Kingdom the
imports shares do not show an obvious trend.3Nevertheless, to our knowl-
edge, Japan and Singapore have been steadily opening their capital market
and restructuring their tariﬀ system. The import shares seemingly cannot
appropriately reﬂect the actual openness conditions for those countries.
Moreover, it can be seen from table 4.1 that compared to the G7 countries,
the NIEs have a relatively high imports share. Especially for Hong Kong
and Singapore, their periods of averaged import shares are as high as 89.6
percent and 152.2 percent respectively. Since Hong Kong is an interna-
tional harbor and Singapore is a city country, it is not strange for them to
have such high imports shares.
If we compare the openness and inﬂation in the NIEs, it is easily noticed
that Singapore, who has the highest openness but enjoys the lowest inﬂa-
tion, is the standard model that fulﬁlls the argument of time consistency
theory. However, there exist some cases that are not satisﬁed by the theory.
Hong Kong has a much higher openness than Taiwan, yet its inﬂation is
higher than Taiwan. If we examine the relationship among the G7 coun-
tries, we can ﬁnd the same phenomena. For some comparisons, they ac-
cord with Romer’s ﬁndings, such as Germany vs. Italy, and Canada vs.
France. In contrast, some comparisons do not ﬁt the theory, for example,
the United Kingdom vs. the United States, and France vs. Japan. If we
compare the two diﬀerent regions’ countries, it is easy to ﬁnd some Asian
countries like Hong Kong and Korea whose openness is higher than most
the G7 countries, but also have higher inﬂation, contradicting the time
consistency theory.
There are many reasons to account for the contradiction. For example,
it can be seen from table 4.1 that Taiwan has a lower inﬂation than Hong
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3. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of openness such as exports/GDP share or (exports   im-
ports)/GDP share have a similar pattern. In addition, the empirical results of this paper are
robust with regard to the opening deﬁnition.F
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sKong and Korea. One of the factors that can be attributed to the low in-
ﬂation is that in the late 1940s Taiwan experienced a hyperinﬂation period
during which the whole country suﬀered.4 Since then, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment has paid close attention to inﬂation when conducting monetary or
ﬁscal policy. As for Singapore, from ﬁgure 4.2 we can see that in the mid-
1980s Singapore’s economy experienced a three to four year economic re-
cession, which caused a serious deﬂation. Therefore, if we use the period’s
averaged inﬂation rate to represent the inﬂation condition, a country that
experienced deﬂation naturally would have a lower inﬂation. However, de-
ﬂation is not a desire of the Singapore central bank (Monetary Authority
of Singapore). A similar situation also existed in the mid 1980s in the Hong
Kong economy.
From the above discussion, it can be noted that the extent of one coun-
try’s openness is determined by geographic condition, traditional culture,
and economic development policy, among other factors. The diﬀerence of
inﬂation among countries also is determined by many factors that may or
may not be related to time consistence theory. If we investigate the rela-
tionship between openness and inﬂation without taking into account these
factors, we may obtain a misleading result. By using a period of averaged
data that includes a period containing an abnormal event, we may have a
wrong description about country’s monetary policy, which may seriously
distort the interpretation of empirical results.
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Table 4.1 Related indexes of openness and inﬂation of thirteen countries (%)
RIM REX DPGDP DCPI
Singapore 152.23 119.86 3.16 3.19
Hong Kong 89.60 98.34 6.99 7.23
Taiwan 31.41 32.14 6.61 5.84
Korea 24.62 18.71 15.31 10.88
Philippines 19.32 17.70 9.98 7.95
Mexico 12.25 12.49 18.64 18.20
Germany 25.54 27.02 3.88 2.76
United Kingdom 23.67 23.10 6.58 6.36
Canada 21.50 22.09 4.85 4.51
Italy 17.30 16.29 9.55 6.96
France 16.72 16.72 6.52 6.28
Japan 10.54 11.51 4.94 5.35
United States 7.16 6.78 3.82 4.02
Source: International Financial Statistics, August 2005, IMF.
Note: In order to compare with the empirical results of Romer (1993), the period of average
annual growth rate is from the beginning of each country’s variable for which the data is avail-
able to 1990.
4. In early 1920s Germany also experienced a hyperinﬂation episode.4.3 Empirical Analysis of Panel Data
From ﬁgure 4.1 it can be seen that the openness (imports/GDP) of some
countries have an obvious increasing trend. If an inverse relationship exists
between openness and inﬂation, the empirical result will be enhanced by
using panel data. In this section we analyze the panel data of thirteen coun-
tries to verify the relationship.5 In order to compare, we adopt the empiri-
cal model suggested by Romer (1993) which is of the form:
 it   a0   a1OPENi,t   a2yi,t   εi,t, i   1, 2, . . . , 11 t   1, 2, . . . , n,
where  it is country i’s inﬂation at period t; OPENi,t is country i’s openness
at period t, which is measured by imports/GDP share; and yi,t is country i’s
real per capita Gross Domestic Product at period t.
Table 4.2shows the empirical results of panel data regression of thirteen
countries. Since we argue that each country has its own characteristics con-
cerning inﬂation, we include diﬀerent constant terms for diﬀerent coun-
tries. Column (1) is the model proposed by Romer (1993). It can be seen
that in most cases there exist a positive instead of negative sign for open-
ness, though the per capita real output and real growth rate have the right
signs.6 In addition, this result is robust to diﬀerent openness, inﬂation def-
initions and estimating periods.7 If we compare our empirical model with
Romer (1993), the only diﬀerence is that we take into account diﬀerent
constant terms. In order to check whether it is appropriate to restrict those
constant terms to be the same, we do a Wald test for the restriction. The re-
sult shows, for all cases, a signiﬁcant rejection of the null hypothesis that
those constants are the same. However, for verifying that imposing the con-
stant constraint will result in diﬀerent coeﬃcient estimates for openness,
we re-estimate our model and show the empirical results in table 4.3. It is
surprising to ﬁnd from the table that if we constrain the constant terms to
be the same, the sign on openness is consistent with Romer’s argument,
that is, openness and inﬂation have an inverse relationship.
By dividing the sample into developing and developed countries, Romer
(1993) found that the inverse relation between openness and inﬂation is sig-
niﬁcant in developing countries, but insigniﬁcant in developed countries.
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5. The data of NIEs and The G7 have diﬀerent properties. Quarterly data from NIEs are
seasonally unadjusted, whereas data from The G7 is seasonally adjusted. In order to avoid the
seasonality problem, we use the annual data to engage in panel estimation.
6. Romer (1993) chose real per capita income to serve as a general measure of development.
However, this variable has a diﬀerent order from other variables such as inﬂation or imports
share. Therefore, we use the change of real GDP as an alternative.
7. In the Romer (1993) paper, he adopted the imports/GDP share to represent a country’s
openness. In order to check the robustness of empirical results, we have tried various mea-
sures of openness, such as exports/GDP share, and (imports   exports)/GDP share, and the
empirical results are similar. Though Hsu & Wu (1993) pointed out that the dynamic struc-
ture of the wholesale price index is diﬀerent from the consumer price index, in this paper we
have estimated the case of the wholesale price index and achieved similar results.T
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.In tables 4.4 and 4.5 we restrict the constant and estimate two diﬀerent
groups, which are NIEs and the G7. From the tables we can see that open-
ness has a signiﬁcant negative relationship with inﬂation for NIEs, but
have mixed results for the G7. For the period between 1973 and 1990,
which is the same sample period used as Romer, the sign on imports/GDP
share is positive rather than negative in the case of the G7, and this result
is consistent with Romer. However, when we extend our sample period to
2001, the sign on imports share of the G7 become insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zeros. To check the robustness of the empirical results with regard to
constant restriction, we re-estimate the models and summarize the results
in table 4.6and table 4.7.It can be seen from the tables that the signs on im-
ports share for NIEs are no longer signiﬁcantly negative. On the contrary,
for some cases they have a signiﬁcant positive sign. As for the G7 countries,
the empirical results for those without restriction on constants are similar
to the cases with restriction. It can be noted that in the case of included
constant terms the coeﬃcients on imports share of the G7 are signiﬁcantly
negative in the extended period. This result may be because a country, like
Germany, has a relatively high openness but experiences a sharp declining
of inﬂation due to a weakening economy.
It can be noted from table 4.1 that Singapore is the country with the
highest period averaged openness and the lowest period averaged inﬂation
among the Asian 4. If we regard it as an outlier and take it out of the
sample, in tables 4.8and 4.9it can be shown that even with a constant con-
straint, in most cases the openness has an insigniﬁcant sign.8
From the above discussion, it is quite clear that the empirical result of the
relationship between openness and inﬂation is sensitive to the model selec-
tion and sample set. Under the more ﬂexible models without constant con-
straint, or by eliminating the country with special characteristics, Romer’s
argument is not supported.
4.4 Time Series Approach
It can be seen from ﬁgure 4.1 that some countries such as Hong Kong, Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Canada, France, Italy, and the United States have an upward
trend of imports share. Theoretically, they are good examples for verifying
the relationship between openness and inﬂation by using the time series.9
From table 4.10 we show the empirical results of time series regression 
for the inﬂation model of each individual country. It can be seen that only
few cases—France, United Kingdom, and Mexico—show a signiﬁcant
118 Chung-Shu Wu and Jin-Lung Lin
8. Romer (1993) in footnote 8 pointed out that “re-estimating the regression with Singapore
and Lesotho excluded, however, lowers the t-statistic on openness only modestly.” Neverthe-
less, our empirical results show a diﬀerent aspect.
9. We include seasonal dummies into the model whose data is seasonally unadjusted, and
only dummies signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zeroes are reported in tables.T
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.negative sign on imports share. The cases that have a signiﬁcant positive
sign on imports share outnumber those that have a negative sign. Even
countries like Canada, Taiwan, and the United States, who have an upward
trend of imports share, also have a signiﬁcant positive sign on imports
share.10
Although the empirical cross-section model proposed by Romer (1993)
may not be an appropriate empirical model for time series approach, it pro-
vides an alternative to verify the relationship between inﬂation and open-
ness.11There is room for improving the time series empirical model, and we
believe that diﬀerent models may have diﬀerent results. However, under
our current framework, we cannot ﬁnd a strong support for the time con-
sistency theory.
4.5 Money Supply and Real Output
Romer (1993) is based on a partial rigidity price model to derive a reverse
relationship between openness and inﬂation. From that model we can also
derive a corollary that the eﬀect that a monetary expansion on output is
smaller in a more open economy. Since we have quarterly time series, it is
convenient for us to verify this hypothesis. In this section, we adopt the
VAR model to do the impulse response analysis to examine the impacts of
money supply on real output.12
It is well-known that the impulse response analysis may be signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by variable ordering. Pesaran and Shin (1988) proposed a proce-
dure to solve the ordering problem. In this section, we follow the approach
of Pesaran and Shin (1988) and Lin (2003) to perform the impulse response
analysis. Since variables in our VAR model are stationary (ﬁrst diﬀerence
of logarithm money supply and logarithm real GDP), it is appropriate for
us to ignore the co-integration issues raised by Phillips (1998).
In ﬁgure 4.3 we show the impulse response of money growth on real
GDP growth according to the order of degree of openness. From the ﬁgure
it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd regularity between openness and the impacts of money
supply. Singapore has the highest openness, and its money supply also has
the most signiﬁcant impact on real output among the NIEs. Germany has
126 Chung-Shu Wu and Jin-Lung Lin
10. To save space in this paper, we only report the empirical results based on Romer’s model
in Table 10, and the results are robust to diﬀerent openness, inﬂation deﬁnitions, and sample
periods.
11. Exchange rate is one of the factors that are important determinants of inﬂation rates.
When we incorporate it into the model, the properties of empirical results do not change.
12. Alternatively, we may use transfer function analysis to discuss the dynamic structure be-
tween money supply and output. However, in that analysis we have to assume there is no feed-
back eﬀect between variables, which is inappropriate to our model. See Liu (1987), Liu and
Hudak (1985). The VAR impulse response analysis is widely used by researchers to investi-
gate the relationship between malpractice and economy, e.g., Juselius (1998), Oxley (2000),
Wu and Hu (2000), Morsink and Bayoumi (2001), and Fung (2002).Fig. 4.3 Impulse response of money growth on real GDP growth
Note: (a) Singapore; (b) Hong Kong; (c) Taiwan; (d) Germany; (e) Korea; (f) United King-
dom; (g) Canada; (h) Philippines; (i) Italy; (j) France; (k) Mexico; (l) Japan; (m) United StatesFig. 4.3 (cont.)
Note: (a) Singapore; (b) Hong Kong; (c) Taiwan; (d) Germany; (e) Korea; (f) United King-
dom; (g) Canada; (h) Philippines; (i) Italy; (j) France; (k) Mexico; (l) Japan; (m) United Statesa similar situation as Singapore, which has the highest openness among the
G7. However, Germany also has a relatively signiﬁcant impact of money
supply on real output. Interestingly, France, Japan, and the United States,
who have a relatively low openness among eleven countries, have a rela-
tively insigniﬁcant impact of money supply on real output, which contra-
dicts the corollary derived from Romer (1993).
4.6 Conclusion
Romer (1993, 1998) argued that the more open economies are, the higher
cost for them to adopt a stimulative monetary policy, hence they will
choose a more conservative policy than less open economies. Therefore,
there exists a reverse relationship between openness and inﬂation. Since
one country’s openness is determined by geographic condition, historical
experience, and economic development policy, among other variables, in-
ﬂation can be attributed to factors that may or may not be related to time
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Fig. 4.3 (cont.)
Note: (a) Singapore; (b) Hong Kong; (c) Taiwan; (d) Germany; (e) Korea; (f) United King-
dom; (g) Canada; (h) Philippines; (i) Italy; (j) France; (k) Mexico; (l) Japan; (m) United Statesconsistency theory. If we investigate the relationship between openness and
inﬂation without taking those factors into account, we may have an inap-
propriate interpretation of the empirical results. In this paper, we re-
examine the relationship by discussing more familiar economies, NIEs and
the G7, which can provide us more information about empirical ﬁndings.
Our empirical results show that for a panel data set of thirteen countries,
models with or without constant constraint give diﬀerent relationships be-
tween openness and inﬂation. If we restrict the constant terms to be the
same, the empirical results are similar to Romer (1993). However, if we re-
lax the restrictions, which are supported by empirical testing, the empirical
results do not show a certain relationship between openness and inﬂation.
In addition, leaving out some countries with special structures, the empiri-
cal results also change signiﬁcantly. When we use the time series approach
to analyze the relationship between openness and inﬂation in each individ-
ual country, for most cases the negative relationship cannot be supported
even in those countries that have an obvious upward trend of imports share.
Moreover, we employ a VAR model to check the corollary of Romer (1993)
that the aﬀects of money on real output are smaller in a more open econ-
omy. From the results of impulse response analyses, we cannot ﬁnd a regu-
lar relationship between openness and the impacts of money supply.
Each country has its own characteristics, including geographic, cultural,
and historical background, and through time many factors drive the
changing patterns of openness and inﬂation of each country. It is diﬃcult
for a period averaged data to reveal that information, and show a stable
regularity between openness and inﬂation. Though our empirical results
are not in accordance with the ﬁndings of Romer (1993, 1998), they do not
mitigate the importance of the time consistency theory. The primary pur-
pose of this paper is to point out that perhaps researchers should pay more
attention to the reasons why openness and inﬂation have diﬀerent rela-
tionships among diﬀerent countries, rather than searching for a uniform
relationship.
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Comment Peter Blair Henry
Professors Wu and Lin have provided us with a useful study of openness
and inﬂation. Previous work documents that openness and inﬂation are
negatively correlated across countries (Romer 1993). Wu and Lin take ex-
ception with this result and demonstrate that the relationship uncovered by
Romer is not robust. In the context of the Newly Industrialized Economies
(NIEs) and the Group of Seven (G7), there is no systematic relationship be-
tween openness and inﬂation. More generally, Wu and Lin argue that there
are many pitfalls associated with using purely cross-sectional data to study
the relationship between openness and inﬂation, and implicitly warn us
not to do so in future work.
The authors begin very sensibly by taking us through the raw data. This
is instructive, because it immediately raises questions about Romer’s ﬁnd-
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in table 4.1 that do not accord with the view that greater openness is asso-
ciated with lower inﬂation: (a) Hong Kong is more open than Taiwan but
has had higher inﬂation than Taiwan; (b) The United Kingdom is more
open than the United States but has had higher inﬂation than the United
States; (c) France is more open than Japan but has also had higher inﬂa-
tion than Japan; and (d) Both Hong Kong and South Korea are more open
than most G7 countries but have had higher inﬂation.
Moving beyond the raw data, formal panel regressions also do not show
a systematic negative relationship between openness and inﬂation. Panel
data allows the authors to include country-speciﬁc dummies to account for
sundry diﬀerences across countries (culture, geography, etc.) that Romer
was not able to account for in his strictly cross-sectional set up. With and
without country dummies, Wu and Lin ﬁnd little evidence to suggest that
openness and inﬂation are negatively correlated. While the authors suc-
ceed in their modest aim of demonstrating the fragility of the relationship
between openness and inﬂations in this sample, I have a few quibbles with
what they have done.
First, although I am sympathetic to the general point of the paper, I
think that it is a little unfair of the authors to make a direct comparison of
their study of 13 countries with the Romer study, which has 114. With the
13 countries in the Wu and Lin sample, empirical power is a nontrivial is-
sue, and the question then becomes: is the relationship between openness
and inﬂation really not in the data, or is there simply too much noise to re-
liably detect its presence?
Second, is this a paper about the time consistency theory of inﬂation or
is it a comparative study of inﬂation in the NIEs and the G7? If it is the for-
mer, then the comments about small sample size in the previous paragraph
hold with greater force. If it is a comparative analysis then I would like to
know more about the inﬂation histories of these countries than is conveyed
in ﬁgure 4.2. For example, is the story behind the fall in inﬂation in the
NIEs similar to that of the great 1980s disinﬂation that took place in the
G7 countries? This kind of institutional focus would add a lot to the paper.
The authors convincingly argue that strictly cross-sectional analyses miss
important insights conveyed by the heterogeneity of country-speciﬁc ex-
periences through time. Indeed, there is much to be learned by reducing
sample size and focusing on country experiences. I only wish that the pa-
per would have delivered a bit more in this regard.
Third, I would have liked the paper to be a bit more ambitious. The au-
thors focus exclusively on the time-inconsistency theory of monetary pol-
icy that motivated the Romer study. This approach focuses on the insight
that in an open economy, policies that stimulate aggregate demand have
two oﬀsetting eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is that stronger aggregate demand stim-
ulates production and raises national income. The second is that stronger
132 Chung-Shu Wu and Jin-Lung Linaggregate demand also increases imports, which reduces national income.
Because the second eﬀect is not present in a closed economy, expansionary
monetary policy has a smaller impact on real output in an open economy
than it does in a closed one. Therefore, the incentive for the monetary au-
thority to surprise the public with a monetary expansion is lower in an
open economy.
This is a perfectly good theory to test, but it seems to me that there are
other important mechanisms through which openness may help to main-
tain low inﬂation. In particular, an increasingly popular view is that in-
creased integration of goods and labor markets helps to hold down the
worldwide level of inﬂation, because the threat of global competition re-
duces the pricing power of ﬁrms and the bargaining power of workers (Ro-
goﬀ 2003). Because the countries in this sample are all active participants
in the ongoing process of global economic integration, it would seem nat-
ural to test whether any of these other channels have any empirical rele-
vance. For instance, instead of just looking at the correlation between
consumer-price-and-deﬂator-based measures of inﬂation, why not bring
wages into the story? Is it the case that wage growth is slower in more open
economies, controlling for things like changes in productivity?
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Comment John Simon
This paper reinvestigates the results of Romer (1993) and suggests that the
negative correlation between openness and inﬂation found by Romer may
not be robust. In my comments I would like to focus on a particular diﬀer-
ence between the approach of Romer and Wu and Lin—the use of time se-
ries data rather than cross sectional data—and its implications for these
ﬁndings.
To provide a reference point for my comments I consider the data for
Australia shown in ﬁgure 4C.1.Openness, measured as the ratio of imports
to GDP, is strongly trending and rises from a little under 10 percent in the
1960s to over 20 percent today. Inﬂation, captured here by the GDP deﬂa-
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Australia.tor, was below 5 percent in the 60s, and rose signiﬁcantly in the 70s before
returning below 5 percent in the early 90s. This pattern, if not the speciﬁc
numbers, is common to many countries. (See ﬁgure 4C.1).
The ﬁrst observation is that time series regressions on this data will have
to deal with the integration of the series. Openness is clearly I(1). But there
is a question about whether to treat inﬂation as I(1) or I(0) with breaks.
Since the return of low inﬂation in the early 90s it is I(0). However, when
using the full sample its properties are ambiguous, and it can be classiﬁed
as either I(1) or I(0) depending upon the particular test used. Similarly,
tests of cointegration between inﬂation and openness are ambiguous. Al-
though, once again, it is pretty clear that inﬂation and openness are not
cointegrated over the recent low inﬂation period (primarily because inﬂa-
tion is not integrated). Given this, interpretation of time series regression
results on these variables will be problematic.
A further complication to the interpretation of this relationship is the
addition of output per capita to the model. This variable is included in both
Romer and Wu and Lin as a control for openness on the argument that
richer countries trade more. But from an econometric point of view, the rel-
evant point is that it is a strongly trending series. A long run relationship
between inﬂation and openness could be obtained if openness and output
per capita were cointegrated and inﬂation was I(0), or a more complicated
cointegrating relationship between all three variables may exist. Regard-
less, I think the paper would beneﬁt from careful attention to these issues.
Related to the use of output per capita is the question of whether it is the
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Fig. 4C.1 Inﬂation and Openness
Source: ABSbest control for openness. There is a large literature on the expected amount
of trade between various countries. And while output per capita is an im-
portant variable, it is not the only one used. For example, geographic loca-
tion has an eﬀect on trade. The appropriate variables to use will be aﬀected
by the panel estimation technique chosen; static variables cannot be used in
a ﬁxed eﬀects regression. For example, while a country’s location does not
change, the group of countries it trades with and, thus, its weighted average
distance from those countries does. Therefore, as the Asian region has ex-
panded, the center of gravity for many country’s trade has also changed.
The second observation is that Australia, along with many other coun-
tries, has experienced a fair number of exchange rate and monetary policy
regimes over the sample period. Prior to 1973, Australia was in the Bretton
Woods arrangement. In Romer’s original paper he excluded data from be-
fore 1973 to avoid problems created by this arrangement. Wu and Lin also
follow this approach for their panel regressions, but not for the individual
country regressions in section 4 of the chapter. Following Bretton Woods,
Australia used a variety of managed exchange rate regimes before ﬂoating
the dollar in 1983. Finally, an inﬂation targeting regime was adopted in the
early 1990s. Each of these regimes has implications for the basic Romer hy-
pothesis that, when there is an inability to commit to low inﬂation out-
comes, greater openness ought to be associated with lower inﬂation. The
most signiﬁcant conceptual problem is with inﬂation targeting regimes,
which have now been adopted by a signiﬁcant range of countries. An in-
ﬂation targeting regime presumably involves a credible commitment by the
monetary authority to a particular inﬂation rate. Under such a regime, the
relationship posited by Romer should be inoperative. It would be an inter-
esting extension for the paper to investigate this further.
Finally, and most importantly, a question that arises in my mind is
whether one would expect to see the Romer relationship between inﬂation
and openness in a country time series in the ﬁrst place? The basic Barro and
Gordon (1983) model used by Romer posits that a central bank has an in-
centive to generate surprise inﬂation in the pursuit of higher output
growth. Romer extends this by suggesting that the incentive becomes
weaker in more open economies and, thus, that lower inﬂation results.
Imagine then, that imports rise in a given country. Is a central bank really
going to respond to this arise by producing slightly less surprise inﬂation
that very year? What if the higher imports are a consequence of lower
tariﬀs? Would a central bank really work to oﬀset the inﬂationary conse-
quences of lower tariﬀs by generating surprise inﬂation, albeit less than it
usually does?
The ﬁrst hypothetical question points to the possibility that any rela-
tionship will, at best, be present over the longer run and not observable in
year-to-year movements in inﬂation and openness. A related point is that
the model emphasized by Romer is static. A consideration of the dynamics
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cross-sectional model estimated by Romer. The latter questions raise the
possibility that inﬂation and openness may be negatively related for rea-
sons unrelated to the model proposed by Romer—trade has generally been
increasing in recent years as trade barriers have gradually been lowered
throughout the world. That is, even if the Romer eﬀect were present in the
time series data, there is no reason to expect that a time series regression of
the two would be able to identify its existence, given the confounding fac-
tors likely present in the data.
More conceptually, it seems to me that the Romer model is one that is
much more likely to be relevant in explaining the diﬀerences between coun-
tries than within countries. In part it is because the fundamental model is
static, but it also reﬂects the fact that each country is likely to make its own
evaluation of its preferred trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation (and the
plethora of other macroeconomic variables); any variation in those vari-
ables is likely to be much more muted than the diﬀerences observed across
countries. For example, the diﬀerence in labor market outcomes between
Sweden and the United States is much larger than the changes one would
expect to observe over time in either country. In particular, the kind of
tradeoﬀs one would identify within the countries would be very diﬀerent
from those that would emerge in cross country comparisons.
In light of these general considerations, I have a more speciﬁc observa-
tion about the paper by Wu and Lin. They emphasize the ﬁxed eﬀects re-
sults, but also conduct random eﬀects regressions. An important feature of
a ﬁxed eﬀects regression is that it removes any cross country variation and
focuses on the time series dimension. Thus, if the Romer result is one that
only applies across countries, the lack of results in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression
would be expected. In this respect it is particularly interesting that Wu and
Lin ﬁnd that the Romer result is observed in the random eﬀects panel re-
gression—that is, without country speciﬁc dummy variables. This is sug-
gestive of the idea that the Romer eﬀect is a cross-country eﬀect rather than
a within country eﬀect.
My ﬁnal comment is on section 4.5, which introduces a VAR model as
an alternative test of the Romer hypothesis. As a central banker, I have had
intimate acquaintance with the raw data that is used to generate monetary
aggregates. As such, I place very little faith in any empirical work that re-
lies on them. There are suﬃcient breaks in the series caused by changing
categorizations of ﬁnancial institutions, that any given monetary aggregate
can give a misleading impression about actual monetary growth. Further-
more, given the time periods covered by this study encompassed monetary
targeting in a number of countries, I think the Lucas critique is very appo-
site. At a very practical level, one of the consequences of monetary target-
ing is that money moves to the ﬁnancial institutions that are not subject to
controls. Thus, when banks are subject to lending controls, nonbank ﬁ-
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M2, becomes misleading and a broader aggregate needs to be considered.
As such, I think the lack of results in section 4.5 cannot be considered par-
ticularly conclusive—it could just be that the data are ﬂawed.
To summarize my comments and make some suggestions for further ex-
tension of the work in this paper, let me suggest a hypothesis that Wu and
Lin would be well placed to answer. Is the Romer result a reﬂection of cross
sectional institutional diﬀerences and country regimes, or is it one that
truly applies within countries over time? A further question is whether the
result is a reﬂection of a third factor rather than being a reﬂection of a di-
rect relationship between inﬂation and openness? I think the paper already
has some intriguing results that point in a particular direction. I would sug-
gest that putting the lack of time series results into the context of the cross
sectional results that do work may help to identify what institutional fea-
tures are relevant for countries that experience higher openness and lower
inﬂation. For example, the work of Terra (1998) identifying high debt
countries as the ones that exhibit a relationship between inﬂation and
openness suggests that all three variables may be indicators of a country’s
institutional inheritance. With this sort of extension, I believe this paper
could provide a valuable complement to the existing literature and a deeper
understanding of the inﬂationary process across countries.
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